Carter's Real Sin is Cutting to the Heart of the Problem
The Ludicrous Attacks on Jimmy Carter's Book

December 28, 2006
By NORMAN FINKELSTEIN

As Jimmy Carter's new book Palestine Peace Not Apartheid climbs the
bestseller list, the reaction of Israel's apologists scales new peaks
of lunacy. I will examine a pair of typical examples and then look at
the latest weapon to silence Carter.

Apartheid Analogy

No aspect of Carter's book has evoked more outrage than its
identification of Israeli policy in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
with apartheid. Michael Kinsley in the Washington Post called it
"foolish and unfair," the Boston Globe editorialized that it was
"irresponsibly provocative," while the New York Times reported that
Jewish groups condemned it as "dangerous and anti-Semitic." (1)

In fact the comparison is a commonplace among informed commentators.
From its initial encounter with Palestine the Zionist movement
confronted a seemingly intractable dilemma: How to create a Jewish
state in a territory that was overwhelmingly non-Jewish? Israeli
historian Benny Morris observes that Zionists could choose from only
two options: "the way of South Africa"--i.e., "the establishment of an
apartheid state, with a settler minority lording it over a large,
exploited native majority"--or "the way of transfer"--i.e., "you could
create a homogeneous Jewish state or at least a state with an
overwhelming Jewish majority by moving or transferring all or most of
the Arabs out." (2)

During the British Mandate period (1917-1947) Zionist settlers labored
on both fronts, laying the foundations of an apartheid-like regime in
Palestine while exploring the prospect of expelling the indigenous
population. Norman Bentwich, a Jewish officer in the Mandatory
government who later taught at the Hebrew University, recalled in his
memoir that, "One of the causes of resentment between Arabs and Jews
was the determined policy of the Jewish public bodies to employ only
Jewish workers.This policy of 'economic apartheid' was bound to
strengthen the resistance of Arabs to Jewish immigration." (3)

Ultimately, however, the Zionist movement resolved the dilemma in 1948
by way of transfer: under the cover of war with neighboring Arab
states, Zionist armies proceeded to "ethnically cleanse" (Morris) the
bulk of the indigenous population, creating a state that didn't need
to rely on anachronistic structures of Western supremacy. (4)

After Israel conquered the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 the same
demographic dilemma resurfaced and alongside it the same pair of
options. Once again Zionists simultaneously laid the foundations for
apartheid in the Occupied Palestinian Territory while never quite
abandoning hope that an expulsion could be carried off in the event of
war. (5)

After four decades of Israeli occupation, the infrastructure and
superstructure of apartheid have been put in place. Outside the
never-never land of mainstream American Jewry and U.S. media this
reality is barely disputed. Indeed, already more than a decade ago
while the world was celebrating the Oslo Accords, seasoned Israeli
analyst and former deputy mayor of Jerusalem Meron Benvenisti
observed, "It goes without saying that 'cooperation' based on the
current power relationship is no more than permanent Israeli
domination in disguise, and that Palestinian self-rule is merely a
euphemism for Bantustanization." (6)

If it's "foolish and unfair," "irresponsibly provocative" and
"dangerous and anti-Semitic" to make the apartheid comparison, then
the roster of commentators who have gone awry is rather puzzling. For
example, a major 2002 study of Israeli settlement practices by the
respected Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem concluded:
"Israel has created in the Occupied Territories a regime of separation
based on discrimination, applying two separate systems of law in the
same area and basing the rights of individuals on their nationality.
This regime is the only one of its kind in the world, and is
reminiscent of distasteful regimes from the past, such as the
apartheid regime in South Africa." A more recent B'Tselem publication
on the road system Israel has established in the West Bank again
concluded that it "bears striking similarities to the racist Apartheid
regime," and even "entails a greater degree of arbitrariness than was
the case with the regime that existed in South Africa." (7)

Those sharing Carter's iniquitous belief also include the editorial
board of Israel's leading newspaper Haaretz, which observed in
September 2006 that "the apartheid regime in the territories remains
intact; millions of Palestinians are living without rights, freedom of
movement or a livelihood, under the yoke of ongoing Israeli
occupation," as well as former Israeli Knesset member Shulamit Aloni,
former Israeli Ambassador to South Africa Alon Liel, South African
Archbishop and Nobel Laureate for Peace Desmond Tutu and "father" of
human rights law in South Africa John Dugard. (8)

Indeed, the list apparently also includes former Israeli prime
minister Ariel Sharon. Pointing to his "fixation with Bantustans,"
Israeli researcher Gershom Gorenberg concluded that it is "no
accident" that Sharon's plan for the West Bank "bears a striking
resemblance to the 'grand apartheid' promoted by the old South African
regime." Sharon himself reportedly stated that "the Bantustan model
was the most appropriate solution to the conflict." (9)

The denial of Carter's critics recalls the glory days of the Daily
Worker. Kinsley asserts that "no one has yet thought to accuse Israel
of creating a phony country in finally acquiescing to the creation of
a Palestinian state." In the real world what he claims "no one has yet
thought" couldn't be more commonplace. The Economist typically reports
that Palestinians have been asked to choose between "a Swiss-cheese
state, comprising most of the West Bank but riddled with settlements,
in which travel is severely hampered," and Israel "pulling out from up
to 40 percent or 50 percent of the West Bank's territory unilaterally,
while keeping most of its settlements." (10)

The shrill reaction to Carter's mention of apartheid is probably due
not only to the term's emotive resonances but its legal-political
implications as well. According to Additional Protocol I to the 1949
Geneva Conventions as well as the Statute of the International
Criminal Court, "practices of apartheid" constitute war crimes. Small
wonder, then, that despite--or, rather, because of--its aptness,
Carter is being bullied into repudiating the term. (11)

Partial or full withdrawal?

In order to discredit Carter the media keep citing the inflammatory
rhetoric of his former collaborator at the Carter Center, Kenneth
Stein. On inspection, however, Stein's claims prove to be devoid of
content. Consider the main one of Carter's "egregious and inexcusable
errors" that Stein enumerates. (12)

According to Stein, Carter erroneously infers on the basis of U.N.
Resolution 242 that Israel "must" withdraw from the West Bank and
Gaza. It is true that whereas media pundits often allege that the
extent of Israel's withdrawal is subject to negotiations, Carter
forthrightly asserts that Israel's "borders must coincide with those
prevailing from 1949 until 1967 (unless modified by mutually agreeable
land swaps), specified in the unanimously adopted U.N. Resolution 242,
which mandates Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories." (13)

In fact and to his credit Carter is right on the mark.

Shortly after the June 1967 war the U.N General Assembly met in
emergency session.

There was "near unanimity" on "the withdrawal of the armed forces from
the territory of neighboring Arab states," Secretary-General U Thant
subsequently observed, because "everyone agrees that there should be
no territorial gains by military conquest." (14)

When the General Assembly couldn't reach consensus on a comprehensive
resolution, deliberations moved to the Security Council. In November
1967 the Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 242, the
preambular paragraph of which emphasized "the inadmissibility of the
acquisition of territory by war." The main framer of 242, Lord Caradon
of the United Kingdom, later recalled that without this preambular
statement "there could have been no unanimous vote" in the Security
Council. (15) Fully 10 of the 15 Security Council members stressed in
their interventions the "inadmissibility" principle and Israel's
obligation to fully withdraw while none of the five other members
registered any disagreement. (16)

For its part the United States repeatedly made clear that it
contemplated at most minor and mutual border adjustments (hence
Carter's caveat of "mutually agreeable land swaps"). Jordanian leaders
were told in early November 1967 that "some territorial adjustment
will be required" on the West Bank but "there must be mutuality in
adjustments" and, on a second occasion, that the U.S. supported "minor
border rectifications" but Jordan would "obtain compensationfor any
territory it is required to give up." (17)
When Israel first proposed annexation of West Bank territory, the U.S.
vehemently replied that 242 "never meant that Israel could extend its
territory to [the] West Bank," and that "there will be no peace if
Israel tries to hold onto large chunks of territory." (18)

In private Israeli leaders themselves suffered no illusions on the
actual meaning of 242. During a closed session of the Labor Party in
1968 Moshe Dayan counseled against endorsing 242 because "it means
withdrawal to the 4 June [1967] boundaries, and because we are in
conflict with the SC [Security Council] on that resolution." (19)

In its landmark 2004 advisory opinion, "Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall In the Occupied Palestinian Territory," the
International Court of Justice repeatedly affirmed the preambular
paragraph of Resolution 242 emphasizing the inadmissibility of
territorial conquest as well as a 1970 General Assembly resolution
emphasizing that "No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat
or use of force shall be recognized as legal." The World Court denoted
this principle a "corollary" of the U.N. Charter and as such
"customary international law" and a "customary rule" binding on all
member States of the United Nations. It merits notice that on this
crucial point none of the Court's 15 justices registered any dissent.
(20)

Carter's real sin is that he cut to the heart of the problem: "Peace
will come to Israel and the Middle East only when the Israeli
government is willing to comply with international law."

Norman Finkelstein's most recent book is Beyond Chutzpah: On the
misuse of anti-Semitism and the abuse of history (University of
California Press). His web site is www.NormanFinkelstein.com.

Notes

(1) Michael Kinsley, "It's Not Apartheid," Washington Post (12
December 2006); "Jimmy Carter vs. Jimmy Carter," editorial, Boston
Globe (16 December 2006); Julie Bosman, "Carter Book Stirs Furor With
Its View of Israelis' 'Apartheid'," New York Times (14 December 2006).

(2) Benny Morris, "Revisiting the Palestinian exodus of 1948," in
Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (eds), The War for Palestine
(Cambridge: 2001), pp. 39-40.

(3) Norman and Helen Bentwich, Mandate Memories, 1918-1948 (New York:
1965), p. 53.

(4) Ari Shavit, "Survival of the Fittest," interview with Benny Morris, Haaretz

(9 January 2004).

(5) Norman Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine
Conflict, second edition (New York: 2003), pp. xxvii-xxxi.

(6) Meron Benvenisti, Intimate Enemies (New York: 1995), p. 232.

(7) B'Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the
Occupied Territories), Land Grab: Israel's settlement policy in the
West Bank (May 2002), p. 104. B'Tselem (Israeli Information Center for
Human Rights in the Occupied Territories), Forbidden Roads: Israel's
discriminatory road regime in the West Bank (August 2004), p. 3.

(8) "The Problem That Disappeared," editorial, Haaretz (11 September
2006), Roee Nahmias, "'Israeli Terror is Worse,'" Yediot Ahronot (29
July 2005) (Aloni), Chris McGreal, "Worlds Apart: Israel, Palestine
and Apartheid" and "Brothers In Arms: Israel's secret pact with
Pretoria," Guardian (6 February 2006, 7 February 2006) (Tutu, Liel),
John Dugard, "Apartheid: Israelis Adopt What South Africa Dropped,"
Atlanta Journal -Constitution (29 November 2006).

(9) Gershom Gorenberg, "Road Map to Grand Apartheid? Ariel Sharon's
South African inspiration," American Prospect (3 July 2003). Akiva
Eldar, "Sharon's Bantustans Are Far from Copenhagen's Hope," Haaretz
(13 May 2003).

(10) "Ever More Separate," Economist (20 October 2005).

(11) Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary
International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I: Rules (Cambridge: 2005), pp.
310-11, 586, 588-9. The quoted phrase comes from Additional Protocol
I; the wording in the ICC statute slightly differs.

(12) Rachel Zelkowitz, "Professor Describes Carter 'Inaccuracies',"
The Emory Wheel (12 December 2006).

(13) Carter, Palestine, p. 208.

(14) "Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on
the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1966--15 June 1967," in General
Assembly, Official Records: Twenty-Second Session, Supplement No. 1A.
United Nations (15 September 1967), para. 47.

(15) Lord Caradon et al., U.N. Security Council Resolution 242: A Case
Study in Diplomatic Ambiguity (Washington, D.C.: 1981), p. 13.

(16) John McHugo, "Resolution 242: A Legal Reappraisal of the
Right-Wing Israeli Interpretation of the Withdrawal Phrase With
Reference to the Conflict Between Israel and the Palestinians," in
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (October 2002), pp.
866-872.

(17) Norman G. Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah: On the misuse of
anti-Semitism and the abuse of history (Berkeley: 2005), p. 289.

(18) Ibid.

(19)Daniel Dishon (ed.), Middle East Record, v. 4, 1968 (Jerusalem:
1973), p. 247.

(20) Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion (Int'l Ct. of Justice July 9,
2004), 43 IL M 1009 (2004), paras. 74, 87,117.